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by Horst Siebert
Rebuilding the capital stock will play the decisive role in the adjustment process in the
eastern German economy. Investment increased from DM 92 billion in 1991 to 157 billion
in 1994 (in current prices). It amounted to 60 percent of GDP. Investment has been heavily
concentrated in buildings; only one-third has gone to machinery and equipment. Less than
20 percent of investments have gone to industry.
Using back-of-the envelope calculations, it is shown that eastern Germany still needs a
massive capital accumulation in the years to come, more than DM 1 trillion in the enterprise
sector. In addition, the housing sector and infrastructure will require sizeable investment.
In the adjustment process in the eastern German economy, the J-curve of transition with
respect to production and the u-curve with respect to employment are becoming evident.
Because transfers have stimulated the nontradables sector, a Dutch-disease phenomenon
has been superimposed on the transformation problem. The production of nontradables in
some sectors has doubled since the second half of 1990, as, for instance, in construction
and in construction-related industries. However, in the tradables sector, especially in the
capital goods sector, the 1990 production level has not yet been reached. An export basis
has not yet been developed.
With respect to GDP, the catching-up process has taken place with remarkable speed. GDP
per capita (in current prices) rose from 31 percent of the western German level in 1991 to
47.9 percent in 1994. This implies a convergence rate of roughly 6-7 percent per year,
which is by far higher than the Barro rule of 2 percent.
Assuming a target of 80 percent of the western German GDP per capita level, the growth
gap for alternative growth differentials between eastern and western Germany is calcu-
lated. If eastern Germany had a growth advantage of 5 percent, it would reach 80 percent
of the western German GDP per capita level in 2004. If west Berlin is included in eastern
Germany, the target is reached two years earlier.
Economic policy for eastern Germany will have to return to normality in the future, treating
eastern Germany as just any other region in Germany. Transfers will have to be reduced.
The excess of absorptive consumption over domestic production will have to be reduced
and the difference between the trade deficit and gross investment will also have to be re-
duced. Whereas eastern Germany seems to be moving in the right direction, German uni-
fication has drastically disturbed the macroeconomic policy mix between fiscal policy,
wage policy and monetary policy, and Germany will be occupied for some time in trying
to find a sustainable steady-state position in that policy mix.
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In this paper, the adjustment process in the
eastern German economy is studied. Theoretical
analysis of the transformation process suggests a
J-curve of adjustment in production and capital
stock and a u-curve of adjustment in employ-
ment (Section I). The empirical data correspond
to these hypotheses (Section II). A fascinating
question is how the adjustment process will pro-
ceed in the future (Section III). Here, investment
and the building-up of a new capital stock will
play a crucial role. As in the Hicksian theory of
the business cycle, where autonomous invest-
ment hammering in the basement will eventually
move an economy out of recession (Hicks 1950,
p. 105), capital accumulation in eastern Ger-
many will play the decisive role in the adjust-
ment process. As investment activity increases,
the question arises as to when economic policy
for eastern Germany will be able to return to
normality (Section IV). Meanwhile, the eco-
nomic shock that German unification caused its
European neighbors can be considered as a by-
gone (Section V).
I. Transition as a Shock to a Socialist Economy
In the economics of transition, eastern Germany
is a special case among the post-socialist
economies. Monetary stabilization was achieved
instantaneously by extending the currency area
of the D-mark to eastern Germany in the mone-
tary union of July 1, 1990. The institutional in-
frastructure was, in principle, introduced in one
stroke when eastern Germany joined western
Germany, according to Article 23 of the German
constitution, on October 3, 1990. Thus, the ap-
proach to transformation was a big bang: Of the
three major areas of economic reform in the
process of transformation (Siebert 1994b), only
the third major area of reform remains to be
tackled, namely, the real adjustment in the econ-
omy, especially in the previously state-owned
firms. Here, transfers from western Germany
have eased the transformation process, so that
the eastern German case can be interpreted as a
big bang with the big brother (Siebert 1993c).
The transition from central planning to a
market economy can be interpreted as a shock to
the economic system. Whereas in eastern Ger-
many an institutional void, characteristic of the
transformation in Eastern Europe, was pre-
vented, the economic environment was com-
pletely changed for the existing firms. In the
tradables sector, they were exposed to inter-
national competition, hi the nontradables sector,
the splitting up of firms into smaller units im-
plied that firms would lose their monopolistic
position. Moreover, a new price vector prevailed
to which firms had to adjust. As a rule, relative
prices for tradable goods fell because of the in-
tensification of competition, because of a re-
definition of scarcities and because of the aboli-
tion or reduction of subsidies. Whereas pro-
ducers' prices for tradable products went down,
prices for inputs, for instance, for foreign inter-
mediate products, labor, energy and for the use
of the environment, increased. What was of par-
ticular importance was that firms had to bear the
costs of financial capital that had previously
been provided free of charge.
The competitiveness of a representative firm
was not only determined by the pressures of de-
creasing product prices and increasing factor
prices, but, additionally, by product quality,
which socialist firms have hitherto not produced
and to which the new competition also pertained.
Thus, the transition to a market economy con-
fronted firms with a completely different set of
restrictions in their profit calculations — they
faced a real shock. The sudden change in the
economic setting entailed a massive devaluationof the firms' assets, which became partially or
completely obsolete.
1
Using the abrupt decrease in the producers'
prices as simplifying representation of the shock
and assuming a given technology and capital
stock, it can be shown that the present value of
profits, i.e., the value of the firm, will decrease
(Van Long and Siebert 1992). For most eastern
German firms, this shock has proven to imply
negative profits; that is, without thorough re-
structuring and an injection of new capital and
new technology, most of the firms were not
viable.
The above analysis suggests a typical adjust-
ment path for the representative firm and — ag-
gregating over all the firms — for the economy
as a whole. The price shock leads to an instan-
taneous devaluation of the existing capital stock.
If the firm can sustain production at all (path i in
Figure IB), investments will build up a new
capital stock. Otherwise, the value will fall to
zero (path if). Depending on the lags resulting
from planning investment projects, from ad-
ministrative procedures and from construction,
the increase in the capital stock will take time.
That is, after the initial drop, the time profile
will show a smooth increase in the new capital
stock.
The time profile of production corresponds to
the time profile of the capital stock. Output de-
creases when investment projects are imple-
mented and when firms close. That is, both
capital stock and production broadly follow a J-
shaped path, with an immediate drop after the
shock and a gradual recovery (Figure 1C). The
drop in production is accompanied by a drop in
employment. The sudden reduction in the value
of the capital stock forces a fall in employment,
as the firm becomes unable to earn the labor
costs with the initial capital equipment. Conse-
quently, labor demand is rapidly reduced, and
only increases with investment, in most cases to
a level lower than the original level, because the
initial level of employment was distorted. Thus,
a u-curve of employment corresponds to the J-
curve of production, with the ultimate peak
falling short of the initial employment level.









n. The Adjustment Process
In the following, actual adjustments in produc-
tion, in employment and in the capital stock are
discussed in more detail.
1. Adjustment in Production
The J-curve of the real adjustment process has
different shapes for different young market
economies. The most pervasive fall in produc-
tion has been observed in eastern Germany.
There, industrial production decreased to a third
of its 1989 level in 1991 (Figure Al),
2 whereas
in Poland, in the Czech Republic and in
Hungary the decline was much smaller. This is
not surprising, because eastern Germany did nothave the exchange rate and the wage rate as
shock absorbers.
Establishing the private ownership of firms
and real estate — an important precondition for
adjustment to take place — required time.
Meanwhile, the Treuhand Agency has privatized
the whole enterprise sector of the eastern
German economy within four years, with only
65 firms out of 13,800 still to be privatized
(December 1994). Only 20,000 employees of
originally 4 million remain on the payrolls of
Treuhand. As regards the restitution of private
property, roughly 50 percent of the 2.3 million
applications (of which 2.1 million relate to
houses and lots) have been processed (end of
1994). In the last two years, property rights
problems have not been an issue when firms
have been privatized. But they are still relevant
in the housing sector, and consequently for the
development of the inner cities.
The adjustment process in eastern Germany is
characterized by the relatively strong expansion
of the nontradables sector. In the local and
regional goods sector, the adjustment process is
proceeding smoothly. This holds for construc-
tion and for the construction-related industries,
for the crafts, and for the services sector. The
contribution of these sectors to GDP has risen
(Figure 2).
3 In the nontradables sector, the index
for net production increased considerably be-
tween the fourth quarter of 1990 and the fourth
quarter of 1994 (Table Al), for instance in
structural metal products which are construc-
tion-related (110.6 percent), metal products
(74.6 percent), printing (74.9 percent) and in the
construction industry (115.8 percent).
The reason why the nontradables sector ad-
justed more quickly than the tradables sector is
that nontradables were not exposed to inter-
national competition in the product markets and
that new firms could be established with less
difficulty. Moreover, local markets were a nice
target for direct investment from outside. In
addition, a Dutch-disease phenomenon was
superimposed on the adjustment process in the
new Lander as a result of the transfers from
western Germany to eastern German households
(Siebert 1993a; Greiner et al. 1994). These
transfers have stimulated consumption demand
Figure 2 - GDP in Eastern Germany by Sector^
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for nontradables; the nontradables sector has
attracted capital and qualified labor, and has
driven up factor costs, including wages, in the
tradables sector. It should be noted, however,
that the whole gap between eastern German ag-
gregate demand and GDP (in 1994 DM 466.8
million versus DM 255.9 million in 1991 prices)
is not relevant for the Dutch-disease phenome-
non, since the trade deficit (DM 210.9 million in
1994) is partly the counterposition to external
direct investment.
In the tradables sector, however, especially in
the capital goods sector, things do not look so
bright. It has been extremely difficult for eastern
German firms to establish themselves in western
German and international markets, to develop
the right product for a market niche, and to
break into existing relations between buyers and
sellers. An export base has not yet been clearly
established.
In 1994, the producing sector, which com-
prises energy, mining, manufacturing and con-struction, actually reached the production level
of the second half of 1990 (for more details, see
Table Al). The output index in manufacturing
stood at 84.2 percent of the level in the second
half of 1990. In the capital goods industry, the
output index only reached 64.7 percent of its
original level. In the electrical engineering in-
dustry, the output index was at 67.3 percent.
The mechanical engineering industry (32.2) and
the optical industry (including precision engi-
neering and watches) (24.8) had even lower
output levels. These data clearly indicate a
deindustrialization of the eastern German econ-
omy. The deindustrialization of eastern Ger-
many, having at its root the inefficiency and ob-
soleteness of the capital stock inherited from the
socialist planning system, was aggravated by the
conversion rate of 1:1 between the Ostmark and
the D-mark, which amounted to an appreciation
of the Ostmark of about 400 percent, and by
wage policy (see below).
2. Adjustment in Employment
There is still a large gap between labor produc-
tivity and wages in eastern Germany. In the third
quarter of 1994, labor productivity (output per
person engaged, including self-employed) was at
46 percent of the western German level in 1991
constant prices and at 55.2 percent in current
prices
4 (Figure 3), gross wages (Bruttolohn- und
-gehaltssumme) were at 78.4 percent. Nominal
wages in eastern Germany were at roughly 84
percent of the western German level at the end
of 1994 (although the working hours in eastern
Germany are longer and vacations are shorter).
Construction-related sectors and some sectors in
eastern Berlin reached the western German wage
level. Most sectors were in the upper 80 percent
range: construction (90 percent), banking (88.5
percent) and insurance, retail trade and govern-
ment (84 percent). Even the sectors with
tremendous economic difficulties, the metal and
electrical engineering industries and iron and
steel, paid more than 80 percent, hi the eastern
German economy, unit labor costs reached 130
percent of the western German level in 1994, in-
dicating that this region is still not competitive in
terms of labor costs (Sachverstandigenrat 1994,
p. 113). Labor's share in national income
(including calculated entrepreneurial wages) —
which was 78.5 percent in western Germany —
amounted to 97 percent in 1994 (Sachverstandi-
genrat 1994, p. 114).
Figure 3 - Eastern and Western German Wages and
Productivity Ratios
a
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Adjustment in the labor market shows part of
the expected u-curve (Figure 4). Employment in
the eastern German economy, excluding labor-
market schemes, reached already a turning point
in 1991; employment (including short-time
workers and governmental employment
schemes) reached its turning point in 1994.
Whereas the number of persons in explicit labor
market schemes (ABM) has not been reduced
drastically, short-time work arrangements
(which once encompassed 2 million persons)
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3. Adjustment of the Capital Stock
It will be fascinating for economic historians to
determine to what extent the capital stock of
eastern Germany became obsolete when the new
economic system was adopted. It is extremely
difficult to specify what the market value of the
existing capital stock was for the old and for the
new price vector, i.e., prior and after German
unification. When tackling this difficulty, the
capital stock of infrastructure, housing and en-
terprises in the tradables and nontradables sector
must be distinguished. It is to be assumed that
the capital stock of the tradables sector will have
had an extremely low value and that it will re-
quire a relatively high investment. A very crude
approach would be to use the eastern German
productivity in relation to western German pro-
ductivity as a proxy for the value of the eastern
German capital stock. Very early in the trans-
formation process, I estimated that productivity
(and the value of the capital stock) were one-
third of the western German level (Siebert
1990), coming close to productivity in per capita
terms of 27 percent that was eventually meas-
ured statistically for the fourth quarter of 1990.
This figure implies that more than 70 percent of
the capital stock of eastern Germany will have to
be written off.
Alternatively, one will have to scrutinize the
vector of capital goods and to evaluate which
specific capital goods should be deleted from the
capital inventory. This would be equivalent to an
immediate write-off of 100 percent. Besides this
category of capital goods with a value of zero in
1990, a second category of capital goods could
still be used, but only partly, so that its value
has to be scaled down instantaneously to a con-
siderable extent. The remaining value would
have to be written off over a number of years. A
third category may be written off using a more
or less normal rate of depreciation.
Capital requirements of eastern Germany can
be estimated using a very simple formula
(Siebert 1993c). It is assumed that eastern Ger-
many will have the same capital stock per capita
as western Germany after the transformation
process has eventually been completed; the
western German capital stock is assumed to
grow at a rate of 2.5 percent. Considering a fif-
teen-year period of adjustment, the capital stock
of the enterprise sector in eastern Germany
would be DM 1,750 billion by the year 2005.
This is a back-of-the-envelope calculation for
accumulated investment, which assumes that
eastern Germany's existing capital stock is
completely obsolete, Assuming that one-third of
the capital stock is usable, and considering again
a fifteen-year period of adjustment, a rough cal-
culation shows that the enterprise sector would
need private investment amounting to DM 80
billion per year. Using the infrastructure of
western Germany as a frame of reference, infra-
structure capital in eastern Germany would
amount to DM 730 billion after adjustment. This
figure includes public buildings and equipment,
roads, railroads, postal and communications in-
frastructure, and waterways. Assuming that one-
third of eastern Germany's capital stock is us-
able, public investment amounting to DM 40
billion per year would be needed. Of course,recreating the capital stock in infrastructure will
require more than fifteen years. These calcula-
tions do not include the housing sector, which
will require still more time to be rebuilt
(Table 1).
Investment will be the decisive variable for
growth in eastern Germany. It increased from
DM 92.1 billion in 1991 to DM 157 billion in
1994 (in 1991 prices). It is estimated that DM
180 billion will be invested in 1995 (also in
1991 prices) (Table 2). Investment in the enter-
prise sector, including housing, railroads, postal
services, and telecommunications, accounted for
the larger part of total investment, roughly for
85 percent. In 1994, investment amounted to 60
percent of GDP.
Investment is heavily concentrated in build-
ings, only one-third of the investment outlays are
in equipment. Investment in equipment has
remained constant relative to eastern German
GDP at roughly 20 percent although gross in-
vestment has risen (see Figure 7). In the enter-
prise sector (DM 94.5 billion in 1993), the bulk
of investment outlays has gone to retail and
transportation (DM 35.3 billion), services (DM
10.6 billion) and mining (DM 10.9 billion); DM
27.3 billion has gone to manufacturing (Deut-
sches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung and In-
stitut fur Weltwirtschaft 1995, Table 1).
Calculations of the eastern German capital
stock are still preliminary, hi the years 1991 and
1992, the statistically imputed scrapping of
capital goods exceeded the accruals. It is esti-
mated that in 1994 accruals were greater than
scrappings by 2 to 1 (Deutsches Institut fur
Wirtschaftsforschung and Institut fur Weltwirt-
schaft 1995). The capital stock in eastern Ger-
many is still small relative to the western Ger-
man capital stock amounting to one-tenth of the
German capital stock whereas it should account
for one-fifth if population size is used (Table 3).
Table 1 - Capital Stock and Investment in Eastern Ger-
many and Western Germany (billions of deutsche marks)
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478 526 5,254 5,733
0.57 0.50 0.42 0.42
270 262 2,180 2,395
— ""Production potential to gross capital stock (yearly averages).
Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung and Institut fur Weltwirtschaft (1995: Table 12).
III. Speculating on the Catching-Up Process
The Barro rule postulates that income differ-
ences between regions and between countries are
reduced at a relatively low rate of 2 percent.
This iron law of catching up is based on an em-
pirical cross-region and cross-country analysis
of catching-up processes in industrial and in-
dustrializing countries (Barro and Sala-i-Martin
1991,1992). According to these studies, it takes
decades to close a growth gap.
5 For instance,
eastern Germany would need 22 years to halve
the difference in income per capita and attain 74
percent of the western German level (Table A2).
In order to forecast the catching-up process,
one would need a complex model of the supply
side of the eastern German economy, one with a
macroeconomic production function and with
submodels explaining the aggregate demand of
firms for capital and labor and a submodel of
technical progress. Quite a few variables would
have to be considered exogenously, such as the
level of transfers from western Germany, the
building-up of infrastructure, and the wage path.
In evaluating potential scenarios of the
catching-up process, it is important to distin-
guish between different types of capital, since
the time required to rebuild the capital stock will
differ for them. Capital in the nontradables sec-
tor has been installed very quickly. A large part
of this sector's capital stock is already in place.
However, in the tradables sector, this will take a
much longer time. Part of this sector's invest-
ment, for instance, direct investment by western
German and newly founded eastern German
firms, has been undertaken where profit oppor-
tunities were expected; this type of investment is
associated with a negative cash flow initially —
a cash-sink hole — which can be incurred be-
cause of high expected profits in the future.
Other investments will have to be financed
through retained earnings, which requires that
profits be made. This type of investment will
only come about over time. Financing invest-
ment through retained earnings is especially rele-
vant for the newly founded small firms (for they
will provide the basis of a Schumpeterian
growth process in eastern Germany). The bulk
of infrastructure (roads, telecommunications)
will be created quickly, but mega-projects, such
as a new airport for Berlin, may only be started
at the end of the first decade of the next century
or later, and would need another ten years to be
completed. Also, new transportation axes will
require time. Interpreting the spatial structure as
a stock variable, adjustment will depend on such
mega-projects. Finally, rebuilding the housing
stock will take two or three decades.
Another aspect of the potential scenarios is
what level of adjustment is aimed at. It would
not be correct to go for the 100-percent solution,
because gross domestic product per capita varies
considerably from region to region in western
Germany. Some Lander in western Germany
only reach a good 80 percent of the western
German average. Thus, it makes sense to con-
sider a situation where eastern Germany even-
tually reaches 80 percent of the western German
level of GDP per capita.10
So far, the catching-up process that has taken
place is not negligible. GDP per capita (in cur-
rent prices) rose from 31 percent of the western
German level in 1991 to 47.9 percent in 1994
(38.5 percent in 1992, 44.8 percent in 1993).
This implies a convergence rate of roughly 6-7
percent per year, which is by far higher than the
Barro rule of 2 percent.
A simple formula tells us how much time is
needed for eastern Germany to catch up if the
real growth rates in eastern and western Ger-
many can be taken as given. Let I94 and Y^ be
the respective initial GDP in western and eastern
Germany, a the level to be reached,,/? the size of
the eastern German population relative to west-
ern Germany, and r
w and r











For a given initial level of GDP in both parts
of Germany, the time needed for eastern Ger-
many to catch up depends on the difference in
the real growth rates between eastern and
western Germany. If the difference in growth
rates between east and west were only 2 percent,
it would take 26 years to reach an adjustment of
80 percent. With a 3-percent differential, it
would take 17 years (13 years in the case of a
4-percent differential). Table A2 illustrates the
potential catching-up paths under different
growth differentials between eastern and western
Germany. GDP in current 1994 prices has been
used as the starting point.
Figure 5 shows the closing of the growth gap
when alternative growth differences between
eastern and western Germany prevail. It was as-
sumed that western Germany will grow at a po-
tential rate of 2.5 percent. The eastern German
growth potential was estimated by correcting the
western German growth potential for the size of
eastern German population. For the period
1990-1994, actual GDP data were transformed
into 1994 prices in order to make figures com-
parable. If the difference in the growth rates
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a Starting level in 1994 prices, years before 1994 in 1994 prices, afterwards in real terms. -
 b Calculated using
the actual western German GDP, corrected by population size (23.9 percent).11
were 5 percent, eastern Germany would reach
80 percent of the western German level in GDP
per capita in 2004; if the difference were 10 per-
cent, catch-up would occur in the year 2000.
Figure 5 also illustrates the valley of the J-curve
in the transformation of a socialist economy,
which is a reflection of the existing capital stock
becoming obsolete.
In analyzing the adjustment process, it does
not make sense to exclude west Berlin, since it is
geographically and economically part of eastern
Germany. Including west Berlin in the eastern
German region means that eastern Germany
starts at 53.6 percent of the west German level
in 1993 — data for 1994 are not yet available.
The target of a 80-percent adjustment can then
be reached roughly two years earlier (Figure A2;
Table A3).
Of course, the value of such mechanistic cal-
culations should not be overestimated. It is real-
istic to expect that the time profile of investment
will not be even. There are some reasons for it to
be bell-shaped, with the greatest momentum in
the period 1994-1996, implying higher growth
rates of GDP in these years or shortly thereafter.
It should also be noted that growth during the
process of catching-up will become smaller over
time (Barro and Sala-I-Martin), since the econ-
omy moves down the marginal productivity
curve of capital when capital is interpreted in a
broad sense.
IV. Returning to Normality in Economic Policy
German unification can be interpreted as a mas-
sive structural change or as an economic shock
to Germany as a whole. The shock has created a
temporary excess supply of labor and a tempo-
rary excess demand for capital to rebuild eastern
Germany, both in public infrastructure and in
the enterprise sector. Such a structural change
requires a shift in relative factor prices, which
implies that the relative position of labor has be-
come less favorable. It also implies a relocation
of private capital from western to eastern Ger-
many during the transition period. And it re-
quires that the government provide transfers to
finance investments in infrastructure, to sub-
sidize industry in eastern Germany and to pro-
vide transfers to households (unemployment in-
surance, retirement). This is a shock to the Ger-
man macroeconomic policy mix between fiscal
policy, wage policy and monetary policy.
The need to finance annual public transfers
amounting broadly to 5 percent of German GDP
has changed the structural characteristics of
western Germany. The budget deficit in 1994
was 3.8 percent of GDP, including the deficits
of the federal government, the Lander, the mu-
nicipalities, the Treuhand and the social security
system. Government debt has doubled within
five years, climbing from 41 percent to 60 per-
cent of GDP. The tax burden has been in-
creased, and the government share in GDP has
risen from 45 to 50 percent. Germany has be-
come a little less of a market economy and a
little more of a state economy. The government's
increased demand for resources has created a
severe burden for the private sector, indicating
that the long-term environment for economic
growth in western Germany has become less
favorable. The potential growth rate in western
Germany has been reduced for the interim
period; it is now estimated at 2 percent instead
of 3 percent for the period from 1993 to 1995.
The growth rate of the capital stock is below its
long-run average. The recession in 1993 (Figure
6) was partly caused by Germany attempting to
find a new policy mix.
This situation can only be improved if fiscal
policymakers succeed in consolidating the
budget, in reducing the budget deficit relative to
GDP, and in bringing down the tax burden over
the coming years, hi the medium and in the long
run, their ability to do so will be influenced by
how quickly eastern Germany will catch up.
This will determine the extent of transfers
needed and, consequently, Germany's fiscal
policy stance, which, in turn, will determine the
economic conditions for wage policy and for12
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a At constant prices. - Forecast.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1994a); for 1995 the Kiel Institute's forecast.
monetary policy and which will influence the
growth potential in westem Germany via taxa-
tion. Thus, the catching-up process defines the
core of the German economic policy situation.
Germany's federal fiscal system has the prin-
cipal merit of allowing a decentralization of po-
litical decision making and of giving room to
regional preferences, but this same system
makes a reorientation of fiscal policy in western
Germany rather difficult. The Lander and mu-
nicipalities in the west have larger expenditures
than the federal government, but the larger part
of the burden of adjustment arising from Ger-
man reunification has been put on the federal
government. The Lander and the municipalities
in the west have taken only a smaller share in
expenditure cuts than the federal government.
This is a structural reason why, on the whole,
fiscal policy has not reacted with sufficient ex-
penditure cuts or caps on expenditure increases.
The federal government therefore resorted to tax
increases. Given the current allocation of tax
revenues and burden sharing between the federal
government and the Lander, it can be expected
that the Lander will increase their expenditure in
the upswing, thus not contributing to the neces-
sary reduction of government spending.
Governmental transfers to eastern Germany
will have to be reduced over time, both in rela-
tion to GDP and in absolute terms. Unfor-
tunately, it is not easy to calculate net transfers
for a number of reasons: In an integrated eco-
nomic area, it is extremely difficult to determine
what part of non-area-specific spending by the
federal government should be attributed to
eastern Germany. General outlays are statisti-
cally allocated to eastern Germany in proportion
to its population. A similar problem holds to
some extent for public investment. In addition, it
becomes more and more difficult to determine
trade flows in an integrated economy and to de-
lineate private investment activity in both parts
of the country. An indicator of the size of trans-
fers is the wedge between aggregate demand and
aggregate production or the trade balance. With
65 percent of GDP, the deficit in the trade and
services balance still is extremely high. The
trade balance deficit indicates the gap between
production and absorption. From the macro-
economic accounting identity, we have13
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Figure 7 — Gross Investment and Net Trade Deficit in
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[3] X-M,
where Y denotes GDP, C private consumption, /
gross investment, G government spending, X ex-
ports and M imports. Let A stand for absorption,
with A = C + / + G, and let Ac be consumptive
absorption, with Ac = C + G. Then, we have
[4]
There is still an excess of consumptive ab-
sorption over production in eastern Germany; it
amounted to 12 percent in 1994, but the gap is
becoming smaller over time (Table 4). Instead of
using GDP in equation [4], one could use GNP
data, which include the net external factor in-
come of eastern German factors of production,
mostly income of commuters working in western
Germany. Gross investment and the net trade
deficit plus external factor income in percentage
of GDP are illustrated in Figure 7. Whereas the
net trade deficit relative to GDP has fallen, gross
investment relative to GDP has risen. This indi-
cates that consumptive absorption (in 1991
prices) has been reduced over time.
6 Consump-
tive absorption still exceeds production. Eastern
Germany is not able to produce enough for its
own consumption. Consumption in eastern Ger-
many is financed by funds from "abroad".
Another approach to the external position of
eastern Germany is to look at its external budget
constraint. Rearranging equation [3], we have
[5] S-I + (T-G) = N + Se + YEX+Tr = CA,
where S denotes savings, / investment (plus
change in inventories), T government tax reve-
nues, N trade balance, Se services balance, Y^
the net external factor income, Tr unilateral
transfers and CA the current balance. Splitting
up savings into the savings of households (SH)
and the savings of the enterprise sector (SE), and
splitting up investment into private (/g) and
public investment (/G), we have for 1993 data14
[6] SH + SE-lE-IG+(T-G) =
33.6 + 573 -130.3 - 24.0 + (302.0 - 301.4) =
-176.9 - 29.8 + 9.4 +134.6 = - 62.7
Savings are not sufficient to finance invest-
ment. Investment is also financed by a negative
current account of DM 62.7 billion. This figure
indicates private capital inflows. External funds
flowing to eastern Germany include unilateral
transfers to eastern Germany amounting to DM
134.6 million, so that total inflows account for
DM 197.3 billioa Note that unilateral transfers
enter into the revenues of the sector "government
in eastern Germany," which in equation [6] in-
cludes the social security system (unemploy-
ment, health and old-age insurance).
Rearranging equation [5] we have (1994 data
in brackets)
[7] 1= -N-Se-Yex-Tr + S + iT-G)
(167.5) = (210.9)-43.4,
where DM 43.4 billion stand for the term -Se-
Y^-Tr + S + iT-G). This is yet another way
of expressing that the net trade and services bal-
ance does not have a counterposition in invest-
ment. Taking into account that T-G = SG is
savings of the government sector, equation [7]
says that savings (of the private and the gov-
ernment sector) do not cover the deficit in the
services balance and unilateral transfers.
V. Fading Impact on Germany's European Neighbors
German unification was not only a shock to
Germany, but also to its European neighbors be-
cause Germany's strong demand for imports
pushed up the demand for goods in neighboring
countries (raising exports to Germany in some
European countries by 20 percent) and stimulat-
ing economic growth in the European Union by
at least half a percentage point. The opening up
of a new frontier in eastern Germany also re-
sulted in a higher rate of return for capital and
higher real interest rates suppressing aggregate
domestic demand in the partner countries. Thus,
it was an asymmetric shock to the European
Monetary System that put pressure on some of
the European currencies. This eventually led to
its collapse in 1992 and 1993 (Siebert 1993c).
The bulk of the repercussions could have been
circumvented by an appreciation of the D-Mark
in 1990 or 1991, allowing other countries a
lower interest rate. Moreover, the recession in
Europe in 1993 could have been softened con-
siderably. But such an appreciation was not
politically acceptable. In the long run, eastern
Germany will be one growth region in the Euro-
pean Union from the supply side and will be a
growth stimulus, albeit small. In the medium
run, the asymmetric shock will have fewer and
fewer effects.Appendix
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Table Al - Net Production*
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aIndex of net production, adjusted by working days, 2nd hal:
second half of 1990. — Calculated using the index




























































































































Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1993a, 1994b).16
















































































































































*The figures in parentheses show the number of years needed for eastern Gennany to reach 80 percent of westem Germany's leve



















. 1994 GDP in current prices as
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1994b); own calculations.
Table A3 - Catching-Up in Eastern Germany under Alternative Growth Differentials
















































































































aThe figures in parentheses show the number of years needed for eastern Germany to reach 80 percent of westem Gennany's level. West Berlin is taken as part of
eastern Gennany, not westem Gennany. 1993 GDP in current prices as starting values. Population ratio 0.279.
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Endnotes
* A similar, albeit less fundamental, devaluation of the capital stock resulted from the oil crises (Bemdt and Wood
1986). The unexpected increase in the oil price reduced the marginal efficiency of the existing capital stock, and part
of the existing plants, which had been installed expecting energy prices to remain at low levels, became obsolete.
Comparable processes, related to many factors of production, characterize the transition from a centrally planned
economy to a market economy.
^ The empirical measurement of the J-curve is fraught with considerable difficulties because production indices have
been distorted. The transition implies a sizable change in the price system, and indices of production use the obsolete
price weights of the pre-reform period. For instance, data on eastern Germany's industrial output were based on the
1985 price weights up to the end of 1990. Of course, quantities are themselves distorted because of false prices. As a
result, the initial distortion of the output structure is transferred into the volume index. All this amounts to an
overrepresentation of old, obsolete products and an underrepresentation of new, innovative output. Moreover, statistics
from the central planning era may have been deliberately beautified, and gross and net values of production may have
been falsely specified. Consequently, the drop in production immediately resulting from the adjustment shock may
easily be exaggerated. A third statistical misrepresentation of production follows from the fact that the output of small,
newly established firms is often not recorded.
* Note that, for reasons of comparability, GDP in Figure 2 is in constant 1991 prices. Since 1991 prices in eastern
Germany were still partially distorted, Figure 2 does not fully reflect the sectoral change.
^ Comparisons of eastern and western German economic data suffer from a dilemma. To analyze a development over
time, for instance, productivity, one would want to exclude price effects and consequently use constant prices. In the
official statistics, 1991 prices are applied. Unfortunately, prices were still distorted in eastern Germany in 1991, so
that the data for the following years are also distorted. Therefore, if one is not interested in past developments but in
determing the actual relative position of eastern Germany, for instance, as a starting point for the future, current prices
should be used.
^ The convergence rate, i.e., the rate at which the gap between the per capita income of two countries is reduced, is
equal to the difference in real growth rates. Using the same notations as in equations [1] and [2] and letting B denote
population size, the relative income position in period t, yt, is defined as
GDP in period t is given by
(iii) Yr=Y%e«\




As in other comparisons, the statement depends on whether constant or current prices are used. Even with current
prices, consumptive absorption is still positive.21
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